Journal of Urban Affairs
The Journal of the Urban Affairs Association

IMMIGRATION AND THE NEW METROPOLITAN GEOGRAPHY

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ABSTRACT: *In this article, we argue for understanding immigrant suburbanization as one outcome of the mass migrations associated with economic globalization, a process that has coincided with and shaped the decentralization and reconfiguration of the American metropolis. We contend, as well, that economic differentiation among the foreign-born translates into distinctive residential patterns that reflect the diversity of new metropolitan geographies. Using individual and tract-level data from metropolitan Philadelphia since 1970, we describe the intersection of spatial differentiation (suburban variety) with both demographic diversity (ethnic and racial differentiation) and linked patterns of ethnic and racial population growth and decline. We highlight the importance of immigration to population and economic growth, the diversity among immigrants, the inability of "suburb" to capture the region's residential ecology, and the surprising links between the growth of immigrant and African-American populations in the same places. We clearly show how the residential experience of African Americans differs from that of both immigrants and native-born whites.*

"We are in the midst of a profound remaking of the relationships between people and place that is both rapid and radical," writes geographer Wilbur Zelinsky of recent immigration, "a reordering of basic perceptions and behavior" (Zelinsky, 2001). With the passage of the Hart-Celler Law in 1965, Congress repealed the infamous nationality-based quotas that had excluded most potential Southern and Eastern European immigrants from the United States.[1] Legislators expected a small increase in immigration. Instead, immigration surged. In both absolute and relative terms, the number of new arrivals nearly matched the size of the massive immigration of

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JOURNAL OF URBAN AFFAIRS, Volume 32, Number 5, pages 523–547.

ISSN: 0735-2166. **DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9906.2010.00525.x**

the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. But they differed in national origins—most no longer arrived from Europe but from Asia and Latin America—and in where they settled. New patterns of immigrant settlement have supplemented existing ethnic enclaves as immigrants have spread out beyond the traditional immigrant gateways in New York, California, Texas, Florida, and Illinois to the Midwest and South, areas from which immigrants had been virtually absent before 1990 (Massey, 2008).

In fact, many immigrants now go directly to suburbs. This new immigrant residential distribution has translated ethnic and racial economic differentiation into spatial form. Aside from those who came to America to farm, most nineteenth and early twentieth century immigrants settled in cities. Urban sociologists described their initial clustering and subsequent dispersion as they gained an economic foothold and acquired the means to move to more desirable neighborhoods farther away from downtowns and across city lines (Park, Burgess, & McKenzie, 1925, p. 239). Today, many immigrants bypass the historic first step by moving first to suburbs. Indeed, a majority of the foreign-born, like a majority of all Americans, now live outside central cities. "Unlike more traditional enclaves of the past that were located downtown," writes immigration expert Audrey Singer, the majority of recent immigrants "are building their new lives in the suburbs, even during their earliest years of settlement in the United States, and they are constructing their communities in different ways" (Frey, 2005; Singer, 2005, 2008). By 2000, roughly 50% of Hispanics and 55% of Asians lived in suburbs (Iceland, 2009, p. 38; see also Odem, 2009, p. 114).

This article examines immigrant suburbanization through a case study of metropolitan Philadelphia between 1970 and 2006 and addresses three issues. First, how are immigrants distributed among central cities and different kinds of suburbs? Are there distinct patterns? Is their distribution similar to or different from that of native whites and African Americans? The second issue is growth: how much did immigrants contribute to overall population growth and to the growth of each type of municipality? The third is interaction. How did the presence of immigrants interact with growth rates among African Americans and native whites?

Using data from metropolitan Philadelphia since 1970, we contend that the diverse class backgrounds of immigrant newcomers, when combined with the spatial inequalities of the contemporary metropolis, have contributed to novel settlement patterns rarely detailed in previous literature, a body of scholarship that is only beginning to take seriously variation in suburban form and to move beyond the intellectual concerns of early twentieth-century sociologists. We find that for economically bifurcated immigrant groups, such as Indians and Koreans, class status strongly influenced place of residence, with rich members living in newer, more affluent and predominantly white suburbs while the comparatively poor remained in older and more ethnically and racially diverse areas. By contrast, poorer immigrant groups, like the Vietnamese, resided in suburbs in significant numbers, but importantly they did so in older suburban areas as well as in the central city. In all of these places, comparatively poor immigrants were joined by African Americans, whose disadvantage, despite talk of their suburbanization, remains inscribed in space. Finally, because they are issues crucial to both policymakers and scholars, we underscore the importance of immigration to population and economic growth, in this case by comparing these dynamics across the varied topography of an older, struggling American metropolis.

This article is based on the Philadelphia metropolitan area, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. We call this area Greater Philadelphia and our project the Philadelphia Migration Project (PMP). The PMP has sponsored the creation of a database that maps the settlement of the foreign-born, native-white, and African-American populations since 1970 (and for some purposes since 1950). The database blends data from two sources: tract-level census files and individual-level data from the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS).[2] The tract data and individual

data cover a consistently defined geography, which includes the city of Philadelphia (Philadelphia County) and seven surrounding counties—Bucks, PA; Chester, PA; Delaware, PA; Montgomery, PA; Burlington, NJ; Camden, NJ, and Gloucester, NJ.[3] To differentiate among suburbs, it has borrowed Myron Orfield's typology of municipal settlements (explained further below) and overlaid the population data onto it.[4] We chose Orfield's typology for two reasons: first, it is based on carefully defined criteria applied consistently and with methodological rigor to the selected metropolitan regions throughout the United States. Second, its availability facilitates comparative analysis between metro Philadelphia and other metropolitan areas. Our analysis is constrained by the limits inherent in census data. We are not, for instance, able to analyze patterns below the census tract level and can only obtain attributes about tracts, not groups within tracts. From 1980 on, the census does not include parents' birthplace, which makes it impossible to identify second-generation adults. The generalizability of our results, of course, is limited by the absence of comparable equivalent data. We discuss our reasons for choosing to study Philadelphia below.

IMMIGRANT SUBURBANIZATION AND PREVIOUS SCHOLARSHIP

Suburbs are neither historically fixed nor homogeneous. Rather, they are differently shaped containers, into which people migrate, set up households, find work, worship, and play. They are themselves constructions, built at various points in history from the transportation revolution of the nineteenth century to the communications revolution of the late twentieth century, and reconstructed repeatedly by demographic, economic, social, and political change (Walker, 1978, 1981). Places labeled "suburb" always have in fact varied, as the work of historians has shown (Berger, 1968; Fishman, 1987; Harris, 1996; Hayden, 2004; Jackson, 1985; Nicolaides, 2002; O'Mara, 2005; Self, 2003; Wiese, 2004). Long before World War II, suburbs were industrial as well as residential; they housed working-class as well as middle-class families; and they were home to many African Americans (Kruse & Sugrue, 2006; Nicolaides & Wiese, 2006). But, especially in the post-World War II era, the popular meaning of suburb as a bedroom community populated mainly by families with children retained at least a rough correspondence with reality, reinforced by the massive building of new suburbs like Levittown, highway construction, and by cheap mortgages, especially under the GI Bill. Whatever uniformity existed among them, however, was shattered in the century's last decades. The result, influenced by demographic change, new family configurations, and economic differentiation, was the emergence of new urban forms that called for a redefinition of "suburb" (Katz, 2010).

Immigrant suburbanization is one outcome of the mass migrations associated with economic globalization, a process that has coincided with and shaped the decentralization and reconfiguration of the American metropolis. The human face of economic globalization, immigration, writes sociologist Saskia Sassen, constitutes "one of the constitutive processes of globalization today, even though it is not recognized or represented as such in mainstream accounts of the global economy" (Sassen, 2007). The mobility of labor, as much as that of capital and goods, or the transnational division of labor, marks the internationalization of the world's economy.

Thus, in reality, immigrant suburbanization is a highly differentiated process with origins in the sources of migration outside the United States, the varied composition of immigrant populations, the restructuring of labor markets, and the localization of economic globalization in new and redefined urban forms. "Immigration and ethnicity," argues Sassen, too often are construed as "otherness." Instead, they should be understood "as a set of processes whereby global elements are localized, international labor markets are constituted, and cultures from all

over the world are deterritorialized." This view places them "right there at center stage, along with the internationalization of capital, as a fundamental aspect of globalization" (Sassen, 2007). "International migration," write Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller in their authoritative *The Age of Migration*, "is part of a transnational revolution that is reshaping society and politics around the globe" (Castles & Miller, 2003).

A small literature on immigrant suburbanization has begun to provide an empirically rich portrait of this rapidly growing phenomenon. In a series of signal articles, research teams led by John Logan and Richard Alba (Alba & Logan, 1991, 1993; Logan, Alba, McNulty, & Fisher, 1996; Alba, Logan, Zhang, & Stults, 1999; Alba, Logan, Stults, Marzan, & Zhang, 1999) and Massey and Denton (1987, 1988) explored two classic issues. The first was spatial assimilation, that is, the extent to which patterns of immigrant settlement come to approximate settlement patterns among the native-born, or, more specifically, usually native-born whites. The second issue, related to the first, is segregation. Do immigrants replicate the residential patterns of African Americans?[5] Through an analysis of census data from multiple SMSAs, they identified a number of critical variables—for example, English-language ability, race, U.S.- or foreign-born status, family status, income, education, among others—and the degree to which they were linked (or not) to suburbanization, segregation, and ethnic clustering, themselves related processes as the articles showed.

As it developed, the literature also highlighted additional complexities in immigrant suburbanization. For one, its authors were among the first to note direct immigration to suburbs. They also spotted another trend increasingly taken for granted: heterogeneity within and among suburbs and the increasing inadequacy of the simple city-suburb dichotomy's ability to capture emerging municipalities. Pioneering as this work was, however, it exhibited some limitations: an almost exclusive reliance on quantitative, econometric analysis and little explanation of the data through local history and specific regional context. (Alba & Logan, 1991; Logan et al., 1996; Alba, Logan, Zhang, & Stults, 1999; Allen & Turner, 1996; Massey & Denton, 1987, 1988).

A handful of sociologists have provided a micro-analytic counterbalance to this initial literature of suburban immigration. For instance, in their studies of Monterey Park, Timothy Fong (1994), Leland Saito (1998), and John Horton (1995) have used interviews, participant observation, document analysis, and other qualitative methods to construct fine-grained local histories that identify key community organizations, electoral shifts, political stakeholders, and major events and controversies around immigration. More recently, the geographer Wei Li has conducted a similar analysis for the broader San Gabriel Valley region (where Monterey Park is located) with an additional focus on Chinese businesses and financial institutions. She labels the emerging geography of Chinese settlement, which cuts across municipalities, an "ethnoburb," defined as follows: "Suburban ethnic clusters of residential areas and business districts in large metropolitan areas, ethnoburbs are multiethnic communities in which one ethnic majority group has a significant concentration but does not necessarily constitute a majority" (Li, 2009). Ethnoburbs, she observes, may well foreshadow developments in other metropolitan areas with increasing rates of immigrant growth, including Philadelphia.

Our study incorporates and extends many of the virtues of both these micro- and macro-analytic approaches. On one hand, it utilizes a robust set of quantitative data while also organizing it in an innovative spatial typology, described later. This typology captures suburban variety much more systematically than previous scholarship on immigrant suburbanization has done. At the same time, it integrates the quantitative findings within the historical literature on Philadelphia, explaining the new patterns as byproducts of the region's development over time—not just as stand-alone variables influencing one another with little indication of regional context. And it links immigrant suburbanization internationally to the impact of economic globalization on initiating migrant streams and restructuring urban space. We want to underscore Douglas Massey's call

(1985), made 25 years ago, for examining how "processes of succession and assimilation are affected by structural conditions that determine the relative balance between them." For Massey, some of these conditions included "the state of the housing market (expanding or static)," "the state of the urban economy (growing or shrinking)," "the history and scale of immigration (recent or distant, large or small)," and "the physical stock of the city (pre-industrial, post-industrial)" (Massey, 1985). Though frequently cited because of its thorough appraisal of the "spatial assimilation" concept (which spurred the term's subsequent use), the article's call for a more contextual analysis of the process has been much less frequently heeded. Our study represents an effort to remedy that omission.

PHILADELPHIA AND ITS IMMIGRANTS

At first, Philadelphia might seem an odd case for a study of current-day immigration because it is not one of the major immigrant gateways. In 2006, the foreign-born, excluding Puerto Rican-born, composed 9% of Greater Philadelphia's population. Adding in Puerto Ricans—we will elaborate on this issue below—brings the proportion to 10%. These are small shares compared to 30% for New York, 35% for Los Angeles, and 37% for Miami in 2000, which are major immigrant gateways. However, a few points may be made by way of support for the Philadelphia focus. First, in its share of foreign-born, Philadelphia is like many other American cities—recall that the foreign-born composed little more than 10% of the U.S. population in 2000. These "low-immigrant" cities have received relatively little attention in the scholarly literature. Second, immigration has grown rapidly in Philadelphia—starting from a low of 263,600 in 1970 with a marked acceleration in the 1990s that brought the total in the metropolitan area to 460,891. By 2006, Philadelphia, an important immigrant center in the early twentieth century, was well on its way to becoming what Audrey Singer refers to as a "reemerging immigrant gateway" (Singer, 2008). Between 1995 and 2000, 62% of the foreign-born in Greater Philadelphia had come to the region directly from their home country.[6] And, in all kinds of ways, the importance of immigration to the city and its metropolitan region grows increasingly evident, receiving more attention in the press and from the city government.[7] Third, although not usually rated as a "global city," the Philadelphia region's recent history—overall stagnation, with pockets of success and abysmal decline, industrial sprawl and the unequal rewards of the new service economy—illustrates trends in the national economy that, in turn, result in part from worldwide economic restructuring; its immigrant flows embody the varied reasons individuals leave their home countries and seek residence in the United States; and its spatial characteristics have undergone reshaping and redefinition as a consequence of economic and demographic trends that parallel similar shifts in other American metropolitan regions. In 1910, 84% of the foreign-born living in metro Philadelphia clustered in the central city; by 2006, the number had plummeted to 35%. For these reasons, Greater Philadelphia forms an appropriate site for a case study of immigrant suburbanization (Figure 1).

The foreign-born who have arrived in Philadelphia since the transformation of federal immigration law in 1965 have entered a metropolitan context drastically different from what earlier immigrants faced. In the early twentieth century the concentration of industry in the city center encouraged settlement around Philadelphia's urban core and the formation of a familiar pattern of residency well described by the concentric zone model of the Chicago School. In sharp contrast, Philadelphia is now a regional economy, and, in part for this reason, the descriptive theories of early twentieth-century urban sociologists no longer hold. Where the city proper had once dominated the local economic scene, today industry is radically decentralized, with the once strong central city gravely weakened and the bulk of jobs dispersed throughout nearby suburbs. Meanwhile, the industries that had helped shape earlier immigration to the city are largely defunct.



FIGURE 1

Distribution of First Generation Immigrants—Greater Philadelphia

Source: Neighborhood Change Database (Geolytics Inc., 2004) (data); Census Bureau, 2000 (maps).

Once one of the country's great manufacturing hubs, Philadelphia and its new regional economy now depend on its service sector. And while members of previous immigration waves entered a relatively robust local economy, recent newcomers have settled in a region struggling with slow rates of economic growth.[8]

Still, despite these bleak aggregate trends, the region enjoyed strength in a variety of sectors, many of them luring immigrants to the area. First, the region is home to over 80 institutions of higher learning, many of them leaders in research, the liberal arts, and technical training. The region became home to a reasonably strong financial and professional service sector, a group of industries capable of offering employment to highly skilled and unskilled immigrants alike. It also has fared well in comparison to the rest of the nation in the fields of legal services, computer services, and consulting. More recently, the Philadelphia region has come to boast a very competitive biotechnology sector and currently compares favorably to the rest of the nation in employment in education, health care, and social services—all areas that attract immigrants (Cortright & Mayer, 2003; Delaware Valley Regional Planning Commission, 2003, 2006; O'Mara, 2001). And while the region overall has not enjoyed a high rate of development, one of the important traits of its industrial decentralization is the existence of pockets enjoying reasonably high rates of growth. It is against this economic backdrop of macro-change that immigrants,

African Americans and native-born whites in the Philadelphia region have encountered one another in recent years.

Immigration to Philadelphia has always followed the contours of global economic change and the rhythm of geopolitical upheavals. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, millions of European immigrants poured into the Philadelphia region in reaction to major economic and political shifts in their homelands—the intensification of commercial capitalism in the European countryside, the weakening of the family farm, or, in the case of Russian Jews, the largest immigrant group in early twentieth century Philadelphia, the spread of the pogrom. Decades later, Eastern European Jews continued to settle in Philadelphia, this time to escape Soviet religious persecution. Meanwhile, changes in U.S. immigration laws, the shift to a new, bifurcated service economy with it heightened demand for both highly educated and unskilled workers, spurred yet another major wave of immigration to the city. To these macro forces was added family reunification, already a potent source of immigration, but given an added boost by the post-1965 preferences in U.S. immigration law. As throughout the United States, the national origins of the region's foreign-born, as well as their numbers, shifted dramatically in the last decades of the twentieth century. The new immigrants inserted not only diversity into the city and region's population but promised to renew its workforce as well. Compared to the native-born resident population, the foreign-born were much younger and much more likely to be of prime working age. Indeed, while the share of 20–30-year-old native-born men and women plummeted, the fraction of the age group composed of immigrants rose sharply, recording a 40% increase in the 1990s. Between 2000 and 2006, immigrants accounted for 75% of metropolitan Philadelphia's labor force growth (Singer, 2008). Philadelphia's future labor force, it is clear, depends on immigration.

In the analysis that follows, Puerto Ricans pose a special problem. Since 1917, they have been United States citizens. As such, they are not counted among the foreign-born by the census. They arrived from a territory with its own culture where the dominant language is not English. They left their homes for many of the same reasons as immigrants from Mexico—forced off the land by the spread of capitalist agriculture and the failure to replace agricultural with other employment. In U.S. cities, they have faced many of the same problems as the foreign-born, disproportionately living in poverty, clustered in run-down areas of old cities, encountering racism, confronting the difficult road to economic and social integration. They compose a massive and distinct migrant stream fully as much as did African Americans moving from the South, and a demographic analysis that ignores their distinctiveness by unreflectively lumping them in with native-born Americans obscures a fundamental aspect of the demography and social ecology of the cities in which they cluster. (On Puerto Ricans in Philadelphia, see Goode & Schneider, 1994; Whalen, 2001.) For these reasons, we include Puerto Ricans as a separate group in our analysis of data based on national origin. Unfortunately, at the tract level the NCDB (Geolytics Inc., 2004) does not allow us to distinguish Philadelphia's Puerto Rican population from the native-born white, native-born black, or foreign-born (Santiago-Valles & Jiménez-Muñoz, 2004).[9]

The hallmark of the new immigration is its diversity, not only in terms of national origins but on other important measures as well, especially education and occupation. In fact, Greater Philadelphia's immigrants embodied the five characteristics that, in Castles and Miller's analysis, mark current day international migration. They are the *globalization of migration*—the increased numbers of areas both sending and affected by migration; the *acceleration of migration*—the heightened volume of international movements of people; the *differentiation of migration*—the simultaneous inclusion of various types (labor migrants, refugees, permanent settlers) among the migrants to the same destinations with "migratory chains which start with one type of movement often" continuing "with other forms, despite (or often just because of) government efforts to stop or control the movement"; the *feminization of migration*—the increased number of women among

migrants in contrast to past male domination; and the *growing politicization of migration*—the imbrication of migration in national and international politics and security arrangements.

The recent history of immigration to Greater Philadelphia reflects these international trends. The increase in numbers, first, shows immigration's *acceleration*. The increased number of countries from which 5,000 or more immigrants arrived in Greater Philadelphia between 1970 and 2006—from 14 to 23—reflected its *globalization*. In 1970, Canada and Europe accounted for all of these countries; by 2005, 16 of the top sending countries were in Asia or Latin America. Taking just individuals age 16 or over, between 1970 and 2006, the numbers among major groups of newcomers rose: Koreans from negligible to 20,099; Vietnamese from negligible to 21,020; Indians from 1,500 to 50,253; Chinese from 1,700 to 24,995; Mexicans from negligible to 26,822 (almost surely an undercount); Filipinos from 2,600 to 14,814; and Puerto Ricans from 17,000 to 50,253.

Within these groups, sex ratios reflected the *feminization* of migration. In two groups, Chinese and Puerto Ricans, they had reached near parity. The remaining groups are notably distinct from each other. Women outnumbered men in the case of Koreans, Vietnamese, and Filipinos. The Filipino sex ratio is particularly pronounced, with nearly two females for every male, recording a female-male sex ratio of 0.55 in 2006. On the opposite end of the spectrum are Indians and Mexicans, both demonstrating a substantial gender skew favoring men. The case of Mexico is particularly pronounced, with slightly over two men per woman in 2006. Clearly, immigration is a deeply gendered story. With only a few exceptions, however, researchers have not systematically analyzed the differences between men and women in reasons for migration, employment, or other measures of economic and social integration.[10] (See Hondagnew-Sotelo, 2003). If immigration's crucial gender story remains obscured, its *politicization* does not. As throughout the nation, immigration became a hot political issue in Greater Philadelphia and, indeed, in the rest of Pennsylvania as well. Local governments, for instance in Riverside and Hazleton, passed anti-immigrant ordinances, while a South Philadelphia owner of a cheese steak stand mounted a sign asking customers to order in English (Maykuth, 2008; Preston, 2007).

In part, the *differentiation* of the region's immigration resulted, as it did elsewhere, from the simultaneous arrival of labor migrants, refugees, and permanent settlers. However, differentiation also reflected the differences among and within immigrant groups in education, occupation, and income. In 2006, Indians, Koreans, Filipinos, and Chinese were the most well-educated and economically successful groups; among males, 59% of Indians, 33% of Koreans, 41% of Filipinos, and 44% of Chinese were in professional, technical, or managerial occupations compared to 27% of native-born whites. (On differentiation among Chinese immigrants, see Li, 2009, pp. 134–137.) Among women, the rank order of professionals, technicians, and managers was roughly the same. Income rankings were similar, too. Median amounts are reported here only for those 25–60 years old in order to avoid school-age respondents; they are given in 1999 dollars. India-born residents of Greater Philadelphia enjoyed one of the highest median per capita household incomes, $69,760, compared to $36,000 for Mexicans (see Table 1). U.S.-born whites recorded a median household income in 2006 of $77,578, notably similar to immigrants from India. More Indians, 66% of men and 57% of women, had at least graduated from college, followed by Filipinos—55% of men and 59% of women—then by the Chinese, 45% for both men and women. For native-born whites the figures were 31% for both sexes.

Vietnamese immigrants were less occupationally successful, affluent, or highly educated than the other Asian groups but still ranked higher on these measures than Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, and native-born blacks. Only 10% of black men and 15% of black women held professional, technical, or managerial jobs; for Puerto Ricans the numbers reflect similar disadvantage, 9% of both men and women. Very high numbers of black and Puerto Rican men—51% and 43%, higher than for any other group—fell into the "not listed" occupational category, a measure of their

TABLE 1

Median Household and Individual Income by Select Immigrant Groups—Greater Philadelphia 2000 .

	Vietnam	Mexico	China	India	Korea
Median HH income (25–60)	$43,000	$36,000	$50,000	$69,670	$50,500
Median individual income (25–60)					
Men	$20,947	$17,472	$29,000	$41,500	$29,550
Women	$15,000	$4,512	$14,000	$18,000	$13,500
Total population	19,556	14,769	17,212	28,290	20,304

Note: These population totals differ slightly from the census derived estimates as these are calculated from the Integrated Public Use Microsample (IPUMS), which is a 5% sample

detachment from the labor force. With a median household income of $30,266, Puerto Ricans were among the poorest groups in Greater Philadelphia. Nor had very many men or women from either group—10% of black men and 16% of black women; 6% of Puerto Rican men and 12% of Puerto Rican women—attended higher education for at least four years. These figures point not only to the disadvantage of African Americans and Puerto Ricans but to the widening gender gap among them. In one way, however, all immigrant groups differentiated themselves from African Americans and Puerto Ricans. That was in the percentage of households headed by women: among Mexicans (4%), Chinese (2%), Indians (1%), Vietnamese (13%), and Koreans (6%) compared to 10% among native-born whites, 26% among Puerto Ricans, and 37% among African-Americans.

The diversity that marks immigrants' demographic and social characteristics carries over to where they live, crisscrossing the region with a web of distinctive residential patterns. Immigrants are dispersed unevenly throughout the municipalities of Greater Philadelphia in a pattern that roughly reflects their economic standing.

THE METROPOLITAN CONTEXT: SUBURBAN TYPOLOGY AND EXEMPLARY MUNICIPALITIES

One goal of this article is to show how the distribution and growth of immigrants varied among different kinds of municipalities usually aggregated under the term "suburb." For this purpose, as explained earlier, we borrowed the municipal typology developed by Myron Orfield and his associates and overlaid our own immigration database onto it. The typology divides regions into the following types of municipalities: "urban core" and six varieties of suburbs: "stressed," "at-risk developed," "at-risk developing," "bedroom developing," "suburban job center," and "affluent residential." (Because there were so few affluent suburbs, and they were so small, we omitted them from the analysis.) The median incomes of residents varied among municipal types with incomes highest in the newer suburbs and lowest in the urban core and its older suburbs (see Table 2). Philadelphia County (coterminous with the city) is the urban core (hereafter referred to as the central city) in our study. Figure 2, based on tract-level data, shows the distribution of these municipal types.[11]

Stressed suburbs and at-risk developed suburbs are residential areas with stagnant or declining populations and limited tax capacity. They are largely built out and older than other municipalities. At-risk developing areas also have limited, or unfavorable, financial prospects but are growing. Bedroom developing suburbs combine population growth with an optimistic financial outlook. Suburban job centers and affluent residential areas are marked by their relative wealth, financial

TABLE 2

Weighted Mean per Capita Income by Municipal Type—2000

	Mean per Capita Income	Number of Tracts
At-risk, developed	$23,891.14	288
At-risk, developing	$26,300.21	211
Bedroom developing	$32,044.45	134
Central city	$16,509.30	369
Stressed suburbs	$14,842.36	86
Suburban job centers	$32,684.45	196
Total		1,284

Source: NHGIS, Census, 2000.
Note: Income estimates are weighted within municipal types by the total tract population.



FIGURE 2

Distribution of Municipal Type—Greater Philadelphia

Source: Orfield, 2002 (data); Census Bureau, 2000 (maps)
Note: The municipalities displayed are made up of aggregated census tracts, which are comparable to the distribution of the foreign-born depicted in Figure 1.

solidity, and population growth or stability. In their age of settlement, ethnic diversity, and population growth patterns, these six municipal types may be divided for some purposes into two groups: "old" (central city, stressed suburbs, at-risk developed suburbs) and new (at-risk developing, bedroom developing, and suburban job center.) It is important not to reify this

typology, which, itself, is the contingent outcome of a complicated history and, undoubtedly, will need future revision because the variables on which it is based are in flux.

Examples highlight the major differences among municipal types. Here the examples are: Upper Darby, Pennsylvania, an at-risk developed suburb; Norristown, Pennsylvania, a stressed suburb; Lower Providence, Pennsylvania, an at-risk developing suburb; Montgomery Township, Pennsylvania, a bedroom developing suburb; Cherry Hill, New Jersey, a suburban job center; and Philadelphia, the central city.

Upper Darby, an at-risk developed suburb with a moderately high—13.9%—proportion of immigrants and low—11.3%—proportion of African Americans, is an old, working-class suburb with a declining population. Located at the border of Philadelphia and the terminus of the elevated railway/subway that crosses the city, a third of its housing stock was built in 1939 or earlier and only 1% in the 1990s. Housing values remained relatively low as did incomes, and only a little more than a quarter of residents had a bachelor's degree or higher in 2000. In its economic characteristics—household income, homeownership, and poverty rate—Upper Darby ranked ahead of the city of Philadelphia but below the newer suburbs to its west. As an in-between sort of place, Upper Darby is also an example of a buffer zone. In buffer zones, immigrants serve as a buffer between whites and African Americans; in the case of Upper Darby, between the heavily African-American central city and the largely white affluent suburbs. Sometimes, as in Upper Darby, buffer zones appear in or on the edge of racially segregated older cities when white flight coincides with the arrival of immigrants in need of inexpensive housing.[12] In the city of Philadelphia itself during the 1990s, "Latinos began to create a buffer zone between the White Catholic industrial areas and the African-American communities further west," point out Judith Goode and Jo Anne Schneider in their study of ethnic and racial relations in Philadelphia (1994, p. 55). Similarly, using national data, sociologist John Iceland finds that migrant groups, especially Hispanics, serve as buffers between whites and blacks (Iceland, 2009, pp. 128–129). There is, as of this writing, little published literature on buffers. They are one focus of our ongoing research.

Norristown, six miles northwest of Philadelphia, a stressed suburb, lost population in the last half of the twentieth century before rebounding slightly to 30,873 in 2004. Founded in 1812 and the Montgomery County seat, it once was a vibrant manufacturing center whose retail district served the surrounding rural area. However, Norristown lost its industry while the development of large shopping centers in nearby King of Prussia and Plymouth Meeting decimated its retail businesses. Officially, 34% of its 2000 population was African-American and 10% foreign-born; in fact, Norristown houses a great many undocumented immigrants from Mexico, not counted in the census, who work in construction, gardening, and other jobs in nearby wealthy suburbs. It is a poor community with less than half, 48%, of households owning their own homes. The median value of owner-occupied homes, nearly half of which had been built in 1939 or earlier, was only $85,400 and the median rent, $490. Median household income was $35,714—the lowest of any of the suburban municipalities but still higher than in the city of Philadelphia. A high 17.2% of Norristown's population lived below the poverty line and 28.5% of its adult population had not received a high school degree while only 17.5% had received a bachelor's degree or higher. Government jobs, including many in social welfare, health care, and jobs in the legal profession served as the mainstays of Norristown's economy. There were, however, some bright spots and some potential. One was attractive and affordable housing; the other was excellent public transportation, which linked Norristown with Philadelphia and other nearby places. Nonetheless, only about 9% of Norristown's workers took public transportation to their jobs.

Lower Providence is an at-risk developing suburb about 17 miles west of Philadelphia, close to the region's major interstates, with 22,409 residents and a modest growth from about 19,000 in 1990. However, Lower Providence was much less diverse, with only 6.4% of its population foreign-born and 7.1% black. It was also much newer, with only 9.1% of its housing built before

1939 and 18% in the 1990s. The mean price of homes was nearly twice as much as in Upper Darby and more than twice as much as in Norristown. Its residents, by and large, were wealthier, too, and far more educated, with 35% holding at least a bachelor's degree.

Montgomery Township, a bedroom-developing suburb about 30 miles northwest of Philadelphia near Interstate 276, was growing rapidly; its population nearly doubled from 12,179 in 1990 to 22,025 in 2000. A slightly higher proportion of its residents than in the City of Philadelphia (9.8%) were foreign-born, predominantly from Asia, with a very small share, 3.5%, black. Only 1.8% of its housing stock dated from 1939 or earlier while more than 45% had been built in the 1990s. Its residents enjoyed the highest home values and household incomes of any of these municipalities while, with 46% with at least a bachelor's degree, they were also the most educated. The educational credentials of the township's population reflected its economic base in the health care industry. In fact, of the top 18 employers, only seven were not in the health industry. The idea of a "bedroom" suburb highlights the spatial dispersion of everyday life: people often leave the suburbs in which they live to work, shop, and play, a pattern labeled heterolocalism by the geographer Wilbur Zelinsky. With regard to immigrant settlement, heterolocalism recognizes "the possibility that an ethnic community can exist without any significant clustering, that is, where the members of a particular group are scattered throughout a city, metropolitan area, or some larger spatial domain" because "telecommunications, visits, and other methods" reinforce strong ethnic ties (Zelinsky & Lee, 1998).

Cherry Hill, a suburban job center, had enjoyed its greatest growth in the decades after WWII but before the 1990s. The location of both a race track (since closed) and one of the earliest major shopping malls, it attracted an early suburbanizing population, which stagnated at century's end, growing only from 69,348 in 1990 to 69,965 in 2000. The proportion of its population born outside the United States, 12.5% in 2000, was a close second to Upper Darby among these municipalities—the countries sending the largest numbers were China, the Philippines, and India. The age of Cherry Hill's housing stock reflected the timing of its development: 3.2% built in 1939 or earlier and 7% in the 1990s. In value, its housing ranked below Upper Providence's and Montgomery Township's but far ahead of the other municipalities. In household income it held a place between Upper Providence and Montgomery while the high share of its population with at least a bachelor's degree, 46.2%, was virtually identical to Montgomery County's.

The region's central city, Philadelphia, suffered by comparison. Its 2007 poverty rate, 23.8%, enjoyed the dubious distinction of ranking second to Detroit's among the nation's largest 15 cities (Bishaw & Semega, 2008). Between 1970 and 2000, the City of Philadelphia lost over 250,000 full- and part-time jobs while its population had continued to fall since 1950, dropping from 1,585,577 in 1990 to 1,517,550 in 2000 of whom 9% were foreign-born, nearly 3% from Puerto Rico and 43% black. The three foreign-born groups with the largest numbers were from China, Vietnam, and India. Philadelphia, of course, had the oldest housing stock, with 41.7% built no later than 1939 and only 1.1% in the 1990s. The median value of the city's housing, $59,700, ranked far below the median value in any of the other places, while median household income also was well below incomes in any of the suburbs. Not surprisingly, its poverty rate, 18.4% of individuals, was the highest among these exemplary municipalities. Family poverty rates in Philadelphia and Norristown far exceeded those in the other municipalities. Next highest was Upper Darby. With 17.8% of its residents holding a bachelor's degree or higher, Philadelphia tied for last among the group in education as well as income.

These examples highlight the complicated patterns of overall population growth among municipal types and the variation in relative percentages of foreign-born, African-American, and native-born residents. Sorting out these patterns requires distinguishing between the three distinct, although related, issues outlined at the start of this paper. First, how are immigrants distributed among municipal types? Are there distinct patterns? Is their distribution similar to or different

TABLE 3

Distribution of Population by Nativity and Race within Municipal Types, Metropolitan Philadelphia 1970–2000

Year	1970	1980	1990	2000
1st generation immigrant				
At-risk, developed	21%	20%	18%	17%
At-risk, developing	7%	11%	11%	11%
Bedroom developing	3%	6%	9%	11%
Central city	52%	44%	42%	39%
Stressed suburbs	6%	4%	4%	5%
Suburban job centers	11%	14%	16%	17%
Total	243,473	242,634	251,195	355,801
Native-born—white				
At-risk, developed	27%	26%	24%	23%
At-risk, developing	13%	18%	20%	22%
Bedroom developing	7%	9%	12%	17%
Central city	32%	26%	23%	18%
Stressed suburbs	6%	5%	4%	3%
Suburban job centers	15%	16%	17%	17%
Total	3,950,403	3,665,074	3,661,140	3,552,793
Native-born—black				
At-risk, developed	4%	6%	8%	10%
At-risk, developing	3%	4%	5%	6%
Bedroom developing	1%	2%	2%	3%
Central city	78%	72%	68%	64%
Stressed suburbs	11%	12%	12%	12%
Suburban job centers	3%	4%	4%	5%
Total	843,137	875,227	918,303	1,025,661

Source: Orfield, 2002 (categories); Neighborhood Change Database 1970–2000 (data).
Table 3 shows the distribution of the population by nativity and race within each municipal type at four points in time. For example, in 2000, 64% of the native-born black population lived in the central city and 12% in stressed suburbs.

from that of native whites' and African Americans? The second issue is growth: how much did immigrants contribute to overall population growth and to the growth of each type of municipality? The third is interaction. How did the presence of immigrants interact with growth rates among African Americans and native whites? The analysis that follows examines all three questions.[13]

IMMIGRANT RESIDENTIAL DISTRIBUTION AND SUBURBAN DIFFERENTIATION

The suburbanization of immigration changed the ethnic/racial composition of suburbs. Immigrants did not begin to arrive in Philadelphia in very large numbers until the 1990s. A plurality still settled in the central city and a majority in older types of suburbs, but by 2000 nearly 4 of 10 had either moved or immigrated directly to newer areas, a pattern that revealed the economic differentiation among newcomers. Between 1970 and 2000, the central city went from 62% native-born white to 45% and the stressed suburbs from 70% to 46% (Table 3). Despite increases in their foreign-born populations, other varieties of municipalities remained overwhelmingly native-born white. The shift downward in the native-born white percentage in bedroom developing suburbs between 1970 and 2000 was only about 4 percentage points, from 93% to 89%. Suburban job centers recorded a similarly small decline from 92% to 85%.

Immigrant residential distribution translated ethnic and racial economic differentiation into spatial form. More affluent groups settled predominantly in the newer, more prosperous

TABLE 4

Distribution of Selected First Generation Immigrant Groups by Municipal Type—2000

	Cambodia	Vietnam	Bangladesh	Pakistan	India	Korea
At-risk, developed	11%	15%	25%	30%	20%	24%
At-risk, developing	2%	4%	8%	8%	11%	12%
Bedroom developing	3%	4%	6%	9%	17%	13%
Central city	78%	57%	26%	32%	26%	25%
Stressed suburbs	3%	9%	9%	2%	2%	2%
Suburban job centers	3%	11%	26%	19%	24%	25%
Total population	5,783	20,109	2,071	3,534	28,991	21,135
	China	Canada	Germany	Italy	Greece	Mexico
At-risk, developed	14%	19%	19%	20%	31%	12%
At-risk, developing	7%	18%	24%	15%	12%	7%
Bedroom developing	13%	23%	15%	11%	11%	20%
Central city	44%	16%	22%	34%	25%	19%
Stressed suburbs	2%	3%	3%	3%	2%	30%
Suburban job centers	21%	21%	18%	18%	19%	14%
Total population	23,709	7,489	14,315	17,871	4,822	14,349

Source: Census (2000).

suburbs; poor groups remained much more often in the central city and older suburbs, while groups bifurcated economically distributed themselves among both kinds of places. (For a similar grouping of suburbs in metropolitan Washington, DC, see Iceland, 2009, p. 71.) For the purpose of simplifying very intricate patterns, consider, first, the municipalities divided into two groups: (1) the central city and older suburbs (at-risk developed and stressed); and (2) newer suburbs (at-risk developing, bedroom developing, and suburban job centers). In 2006, poorer immigrant groups were found most often in the central city and older suburbs. Such places were home to 55% of Greater Philadelphia's population of immigrants: Cambodians 92%, Vietnamese 81%, Bangladeshi 60%, Pakistani 64% (Table 4).

For this same year, economically bifurcated groups divided more evenly between the older and newer municipal types: 48% of Indians, 51% of Koreans, and 59% of Chinese lived in the older suburbs. The wealthiest immigrant groups, of course, lived most often in the newer areas: 62% of Canadians and 57% of Germans. Of the older immigrants groups, Italians and Greeks remained most residentially divided, with 57% of the former and 58% of the latter living in the older suburbs. Filipinos spread evenly throughout types of municipalities, only slightly favoring the newer. This reflects the location of employment in the medical field, which was widespread across the region. The Filipino population, 18% of which was involved in the health care industry, included 1,452 nurses and 445 hospital attendants as well as many physicians and practical nurses.[14]

Although only 18% of native-born whites remained in the central city, 44% lived in the newer suburbs (Table 3). Sharply divided economically, whites had nearly deserted Philadelphia. The contrast with African Americans could not be sharper. Only a stunningly small 14% of African Americans lived in the newer suburbs while 60% remained in the central city. A surprisingly high 14% of Mexicans lived in bedroom developing suburbs, undoubtedly to be close to jobs in construction, agriculture, and gardening. Some of the poorer immigrant groups lived much less often than others in the central city and more often in the at-risk developed or stressed suburbs. Combined, however, the concentration of poorer groups in the three types of older municipalities

stands out. The overall trend—the spatialization of immigrant economic differentiation—remains unmistakable.

IMMIGRATION AND POPULATION GROWTH

Between 1970 and 2000, 51%, and, in the 1990s, 58%, of population growth in Greater Philadelphia resulted from the immigration of the foreign-born.[15] During the 30-year period the population as a whole increased about 5% and the foreign-born population (excluding Puerto Ricans) 46%.[16] Immigration, clearly, was the fuel on which population growth depended.

Population growth differed between older and newer municipalities, with the resulting patterns once again representing the spatial expression of immigrant economic diversity. The analysis that follows uses "foreign-born" as a single category rather than distinct immigrant groups. The reason is that the data in this analysis are from the Neighborhood Change Database, which does not give country of birth. As a result we can look at change over time only by foreign birth. In the newest municipalities the population of native and foreign-born increased consistently. In the at-risk developing tracts, the number of foreign-born rose 40% in the century's last decade. In both of the other newer municipal types—bedroom developing and suburban job centers—both the number and proportion of the foreign-born rose steadily in each decade, particularly in the 1990s. In older suburbs, the foreign-born share of the population went down after 1970 before rebounding late in the century. What accounts for the decline in the older areas after the 1970s? Very likely, it resulted from the death, and perhaps departure, of first generation white ethnics who had immigrated earlier in the century.

Nonetheless, the foreign-born proved more important contributors to population change in the older than in the newer types of municipalities. Between 1970 and 2000, in the three older types, the foreign-born share of the population increased much less than in the newer ones, where it jumped dramatically.[17] In the older areas, central city, and stressed suburbs, immigrants moderated population decline. In newer tracts, both total growth rates and foreign-born rates increased. Overall, by the last decade of the twentieth century, a majority of the population growth in Greater Philadelphia resulted from immigration.

These trends in population growth rearranged the spatial distribution of the foreign-born. The foreign-born, that is, distributed themselves differently in 2000 than in 1970. They were, of course, also completely different types of people, largely European in origin in 1970 and a majority Asian or Latin American in 2000. The total foreign-born population in the central city rose from about 120,000 to 130,000, but this represented a drop from over half (52%) to more than a third (39%) of the foreign-born in Greater Philadelphia (Table 3). Still, there were over twice as many in the central city as in any other type of settlement. Here, too, the shift to residence in newer settlements stands out. The share of the foreign-born in older types of municipalities declined or remained relatively stagnant while big increases occurred in the newer areas: for example, the share of the foreign-born living in bedroom developing suburban tracts increased by a factor of four, from 3% to 11%, and in the suburban job centers it grew by about 50%, rising from 11% to about 17%. These trends likely represent three distinct processes: the death and departure of white ethnics from older municipalities, the social mobility of some recent immigrants who traded residence in the city for newer suburbs, and the movement of some foreign-born, especially in the 1990s, directly to the newer suburbs.[18]

Among the native-born white population, movement out of older and into newer suburban areas resembled trends among the foreign-born. Only the magnitude differed. The native-born white departure from the central city, for instance, was much more dramatic: between 1970 and 2000, the percentage of native-born whites living in the central city dropped from 32% to 18% and in the stressed suburban tracts from 6% to 3% (Table 3). This was a white urban exodus

TABLE 5

Distribution of Population across Municipal Types by Nativity and Race, Metropolitan Philadelphia 1970–2000

Year	1970	1980	1990	2000
Central city				
1st generation immigrant	6%	6%	7%	9%
Native-born—black	32%	37%	40%	45%
Native-born—white	62%	57%	53%	45%
Total	2,062,006	1,707,268	1,559,300	1,449,173
Stressed suburb				
1st generation immigrant	4%	4%	4%	7%
Native-born—black	26%	35%	41%	47%
Native-born—white	70%	61%	56%	46%
Total	350,902	289,294	273,263	252,255
At-risk developed suburb				
1st generation immigrant	4%	5%	5%	6%
Native-born—black	3%	5%	7%	11%
Native-born—white	92%	90%	88%	83%
Total	1,148,925	1,041,205	996,037	970,086
At-risk developing suburb				
1st generation immigrant	3%	4%	3%	4%
Native-born—black	4%	5%	6%	7%
Native-born—white	92%	91%	91%	88%
Total	563,707	712,162	815,654	872,541
Bedroom developing suburb				
1st generation immigrant	3%	4%	4%	6%
Native-born—black	4%	5%	5%	5%
Native-born—white	93%	92%	91%	89%
Total	279,479	366,543	492,030	669,511
Suburban job center				
1st generation immigrant	4%	5%	6%	8%
Native-born—black	4%	5%	5%	7%
Native-born—white	92%	90%	89%	85%
Total	631,994	666,463	694,354	720,689

Source: Orfield, 2002 (categories); Neighborhood Change Database 1970–2000 (data).
Table 5 shows the composition of each municipal type by nativity and race at four points in time. For example, in 2000, 45% of the central city population was native-born—white, 45% native-born—black; and 9% immigrant.

with a vengeance (Gamm, 1999). By contrast, the percentage living in the bedroom developing suburban tracts rose from 7% to 17% (in numbers, from about 275,000 to over 600,000).

In where they lived, as in so much else, African Americans remained distinct from both native-born whites and immigrants. Despite some movement outward, they stayed concentrated in older municipalities. Although the percentage of African Americans in the central city went down, it remained far higher than the percentage among native-born whites or immigrants: 78% in 1970 and 64% in 2000 (Table 3). Taking the three older types of municipalities together highlights the trends: they were home to 93% of blacks in 1970 and 86% in 2000, compared to a decline from 78% to 66% of the foreign-born and of 66% to 44% for native whites (Lacy, 2002, 2004).

Consequently, the African-American share of the central city rose from 32% in 1970 to 45% in 2000 (Table 5). The story was similar in other older types of municipalities while the African-American population grew much less in the newer places, an increase in the bedroom developing suburbs only from 4% to 5% and in suburban job centers from 4% to 7% (Table 5). Clearly, these

figures show, African-American suburbanization took its own course, proceeding more slowly than the suburbanization of native-born whites and immigrants and limited for the most part to other older, troubled municipalities near the central city.

THE INTERACTION OF IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND POPULATION CHANGE

The comparative growth rates of immigrants, African Americans, and the native-born raise an important question: were these rates independent, or did they interact with each other and with type of municipality? Did an influx of immigrants crowd out African Americans or native whites? Did the growth of immigrants have different impacts on older and newer municipalities? The answers point to complex and sometimes surprising patterns. Most unexpected was that immigrants generally did not displace African Americans or move into spaces they had vacated. Instead, a rise in the African-American population usually accompanied an increase in immigrants.

At each census, less surprisingly, in older municipalities declining tracts outnumbered growing ones, with the decline greatest in the 1970s. This pattern was reversed in newer suburbs, accelerating in the 1990s. What this shows is the difference immigration made in the last decade of the twentieth century. However, the immigrant population did not track this general growth pattern. The number of immigrants grew in both older and newer areas. The greatest contrast was with the central city. In the central city, the native-born white population declined by over 50% between 1970 and 2000 while the immigrant population steadily increased. Between 1970 and 1980, in the central city 65% of tracts experienced no growth in the immigrant population (Table 6). Between 1990 and 2000, however, these relations reversed, and by the last decade of the century 69% of tracts recorded some growth because of immigration. In the same years, the foreign-born population also grew in 38% of central city tracts where the black population also increased (Table 6). By contrast, the foreign-born population increased in only 8% of the tracts where the white population rose (Myers, 1999).

In at-risk developed suburbs, these interconnections between race and nativity stood out even more sharply. Between 1990 and 2000, 45% of the tracts that experienced immigrant growth also recorded an increase in the native-born black population compared to only 4% of the tracts where the number of native-born whites increased. In stressed suburbs, the interactions between the growth of native-born white, black, and immigrant populations mirrored patterns in the central city. For the most part, in older suburbs and the central city immigrants replaced native-born whites but not blacks.

"Replaced" is used deliberately. Native-born whites were not leaving older areas because immigrants were moving in. Their departure, spurred by the loss of jobs occasioned by deindustrialization, animus toward new African-American migrants, and the lure of inexpensive, single-family housing had started much earlier than the immigrant surge in the 1990s. The disparity between the number of growing and declining tracts within older municipalities was, in fact, a good deal larger in the 1970s and 1980s than in the 1990s. Nearly 80% of the tracts in older suburbs and central city recorded native-born white population decline in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. Indeed, the percentage of tracts where the number of native-born whites declined remained remarkably stable during each of the three decades. Thus, potential head-to-head competition for housing and jobs occurred more often between the foreign-born and African Americans than between immigrants and native-born whites. African Americans lacked the resources to move further outward available to most whites. Insofar as proximity bred competition for jobs and housing, immigrants and African Americans confronted each other most directly. However, it is not at all clear how often they competed within the same labor markets for the same jobs and, with vacant housing plentiful, as it was in Philadelphia, they may not have competed for housing very often.

TABLE 6

Patterns of Population Growth by Nativity and Race with Municipal Types, Metropolitan Philadelphia 1970–1980, 1980–1990, 1990–2000

Years	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000
Central city			
Immigrant only	14%	14%	17%
Immigrant + white	4%	5%	8%
Immigrant + black	11%	16%	38%
Immigrant + white + black	7%	4%	5%
No immigrant growth	65%	63%	31%
Total tracts	367	367	367
Stressed suburb			
Immigrant only	10%	8%	30%
Immigrant + white	2%	8%	1%
Immigrant + black	8%	18%	37%
Immigrant + white + black	10%	7%	6%
No immigrant growth	69%	59%	26%
Total tracts	87	87	87
At-risk developed suburb			
Immigrant only	16%	8%	10%
Immigrant + white	4%	4%	4%
Immigrant + black	21%	21%	45%
Immigrant + white + black	6%	6%	8%
No immigrant growth	53%	61%	34%
Total tracts	289	289	289
Older suburbs[a]			
Immigrant only	14%	8%	14%
Immigrant + white	4%	5%	3%
Immigrant + black	18%	20%	43%
Immigrant + white + black	7%	6%	8%
No immigrant growth	56%	61%	32%
Total tracts	376	376	376
At-risk developing suburb			
Immigrant only	4%	2%	8%
Immigrant + white	14%	13%	13%
Immigrant + black	10%	4%	18%
Immigrant + white + black	50%	32%	32%
No immigrant growth	22%	48%	28%
Total tracts	211	211	211
Bedroom developing suburb			
Immigrant only	4%	1%	2%
Immigrant + white	21%	14%	18%
Immigrant + black	6%	6%	7%
Immigrant + white + black	53%	55%	61%
No immigrant growth	16%	24%	13%
Total tracts	135	135	135
Suburban job center			
Immigrant only	13%	9%	12%
Immigrant + white	11%	9%	11%
Immigrant + black	14%	16%	32%
Immigrant + white + black	25%	19%	21%
No immigrant growth	36%	46%	24%
Total tracts	195	195	195

(Continued)

TABLE 6

Continued

Years	1970–1980	1980–1990	1990–2000
Newer suburbs[b]			
Immigrant only	7%	4%	8%
Immigrant + white	15%	12%	14%
Immigrant + black	11%	9%	20%
Immigrant + white + black	42%	33%	35%
No immigrant growth	26%	41%	23%
Total tracts	541	541	541
All tracts			
Immigrant only	11%	8%	13%
Immigrant + white	8%	8%	9%
Immigrant + black	13%	14%	32%
Immigrant + white + black	22%	17%	19%
No immigrant growth	46%	53%	28%
Total tracts	1,284	1,284	1,284

Source: Orfield, 2002 (categories); Neighborhood Change Database 1970–2000 (data).
Table 6 describes combinations of nativity and racial population increase for census tracts within each municipal type during three decades: 1970–1980, 1980–1990, and 1990–2000. It shows, for example, how immigrant and black populations often increased within the same census tracts. Between 1990 and 2000, in at-risk developed suburbs, both immigrant and black populations increased in 45% of 289 tracts.
[a]Older suburbs are comprised of "stressed suburbs" and "at-risk, developed suburbs."
[b]Newer suburbs are comprised of "at-risk, developing" and "bedroom, developing," and "suburban job centers."

During the 1990s, everyone—blacks, whites, foreign-born—was moving into the rapidly growing at-risk developing and bedroom developing suburbs. Starting with 1970, in bedroom developing suburbs, where immigration was growing, the native-born white population increased as well, rising in nearly 70% of tracts during each decade, starting with 1970. Blacks and the foreign-born also increased in tandem, with both populations increasing in the majority of tracts between 1970 and 2000, the black population increasing in 103 tracts with rising foreign-born populations and decreasing in 28. (Despite its increase, the number of African Americans in these suburbs remained small, never exceeding 5% of the population.)

These trends point to different population histories within older and newer types of municipalities and among native-born whites, African Americans, and immigrants. The populations of older towns and cities became increasingly black and foreign-born. Newer municipalities gained blacks and, even more, immigrants, but they remained overwhelmingly native-born white. Within older places, the decimation of economic opportunity and the arrival of African Americans combined to propel native-born whites to newer suburbs farther from the central city and troubled older suburbs. African Americans, also hurt by economic transformation, lacked the resources to move to newer suburbs in very large numbers (assuming that discriminatory real estate practices would not have excluded them). Even more, their job niche in government and government-related employment meant that they enjoyed more occupational opportunity in the central city and older suburbs, where they faced less residential discrimination. By and large, writing about African Americans' confinement to inner ring suburbs neglects this constraint—the location of public and quasi-public sector jobs—on their geographic mobility. Nationally, in 2000, 43% of African-American women and 19% of African-American men worked in public or publicly supported jobs (Katz & Stern, 2006).

The Philadelphia pattern—increased African-American and immigrant population growth in the same census tracts—was not replicated in all cities. Similar to Philadelphia, in Sacramento

low to moderate income suburbs with large immigrant populations gained African Americans, but not whites. In Atlanta, by contrast, the black and immigrant populations generally increased in different places (Datel & Dingemans, 2008; Odem, 2008). What caused this variation remains unclear, but housing stock is a plausible hypothesis. It may be that affordable housing in neighborhoods abandoned by whites attracted both African Americans and immigrants. Their tandem population growth, thus, would be more likely in older than in newer cities and suburbs.

This analysis has opened as many questions as it has answered. Case studies of individual municipalities that look closely at economic mobility, gender differences, poverty, political impacts, interactions with private and public institutions, and inter-group relations rank high on the agenda. So do qualitative studies of individual immigrant groups that investigate why and how they came to settle where they did; where they lived compared to where they worked; and how they experienced life in their new homes. Research also should supplement the economic differentiation model of immigrant settlement explicated in this paper with other models—ethnic enclave, buffer zone, and heterolocality, as described earlier.

Contrary to older sociological frameworks, most immigrants no longer move first to central cities where they initially settle in housing vacated by upwardly mobile white workers and then, as they assimilate, move out of ethnic enclaves to cities' outer rings, where they once again take over the inexpensive housing left behind by white workers moving to the suburbs. To be sure, as we show, although ethnic enclaves still exist in central cities, they have been supplemented, even supplanted, by new patterns. Immigrants now usually go directly to suburbs. But their choice of suburb is not random. It rests on both their own economic circumstances and the opportunities for affordable housing and work in different kinds of municipalities as well as, undoubtedly, on family ties.

Much of the literature on immigrant suburbanization obscures internal economic differentiation—the role of class—within immigrant groups and paints the distinction between city and suburb with a broad brush that misses the internal heterogeneity within metropolitan regions. Settlement patterns, this article has shown, reflect the interaction between immigrant economic differentiation and the spatial redefinition of the metropolitan area. More well-to-do immigrants often settle in prosperous new suburbs while poorer groups are found most often in older suburbs and the central city. These settlement patterns, in turn, result from the internationalization of labor markets that has accompanied economic globalization, notably the demand for both highly skilled and relatively unskilled workers. The growth and differentiation of suburbs likewise results from the deindustrialization, service and third-sector growth, and spatial redistribution of work that has accompanied the internationalization of manufacturing, trade, finance, and labor markets.

Immigration has become the major source of population and workforce growth in many metropolitan areas. But it has spurred growth most in the central cities and older suburban areas where the majority of immigrants settle. Nonetheless, proportionally, the number of foreign-born residents, and African Americans, has grown most sharply in newer suburbs. Although these affluent suburbs remain overwhelmingly native white, their demographic diversity increased in the 1990s and first years of the twenty-first century, hinting at trends, which, if they continue, will redefine their ethnic composition.

As African Americans began to move into the central city and older suburbs in the 1970s and 1980s, whites decamped in great numbers, fueling suburban growth. Whites left as well because all sorts of work—service, industrial, professional—suburbanized. They left behind inexpensive housing stock, which attracted immigrants. While immigrants replaced native-born whites, they moved in alongside African Americans, with both groups often increasing in the same census tracts. African Americans less often could afford to follow whites to the newer suburbs, where, in any event, they might have received a mixed welcome. They were held in older cities, too, by

public and quasi-public jobs, which had become their special occupational niches (Katz & Stern, 2006).

In the late twentieth century, economic globalization reconfigured space as well as work, while immigrant suburbanization reshaped the dynamics of urban growth. Operating through local economic transformation and population flows, economic globalization crystallized in new configurations of place, work, residence, and ethnicity. Immigrant suburbanization in Greater Philadelphia represents one example. The shifting residential patterns of immigrants, native whites, and African Americans resulted from the economic transformations opening up opportunities for inexpensive housing in some sites while creating new kinds of economic opportunities elsewhere and of the population movements unleashed by political upheavals and a new phase in the history of capitalism. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, during America's first great era of economic globalization, immigration fueled Philadelphia's population growth and mighty industrial engine. It is no less essential today, and for the same reasons. In the earlier era, immigration was tied closely to the emergence of the industrial cities, which housed most of the nation's newcomers. Today it is again linked to a new metropolitan geography, which it is helping to define.

ENDNOTES

1 For good discussions of the politics, consequences, and limitations of the 1965 law, see Frasure (2005); Jones-Correa (2006).

2 The IPUMS are a random sample of the long form census (STF-3) up until 2000. For subsequent periods, the data are derived from the American Community Survey (ACS), which is an annual representative sample of the U.S. population. For a complete description of the data see Ruggles et al. (2004).

3 In 2000, Salem County, NJ was considered part of the Philadelphia metropolitan area by the Office of Management and Budget, which defines the census geography. However, to be consistent over time it was removed from the analysis in the tract and individual data for 2000 and 2006. Although the geography is identical, the estimated population totals can differ slightly due to sampling. These differences will be noted when necessary.

4 Orfield (2002) used municipal boundaries, not census tracts, to categorize suburban areas. To match the tract-level data on the foreign-born, municipalities were assigned to groups of tracts. In cases where the tracts did not match exactly, the municipality within which the majority of the tract resided came to define it. Tracts were selected as the building block to prevent the population counts from becoming disconnected from the geographic boundaries. There were very few cases in which the geography overlapped, as Philadelphia is a slow-growth city, resulting in few tracts being subdivided or changed to accommodate larger populations over time.

5 Two important pieces by Frey do not specifically address suburbanization but examine the understudied relationship among immigration, out-migration, and subsequent levels of group concentration; see Frey (1999) and Frey and Liaw (1998). For a study from an earlier generation, see Siembieda (1975).

6 Authors' analysis; data available on request.

7 For instance, in June 2008, Mayor Michael Nutter issued a broad language access Executive Order covering all city departments.

8 On the settlement patterns of earlier waves of immigrants to Philadelphia, see Hershberg (1981). On earlier waves of immigration to the city more generally, see Davis and Haller (1973) and Golab (1977).

9 Attention to this issue is usually an afterthought or un-addressed entirely in the literature. Here are some articles that give the issue stronger attention than normal: Massey and Mullan (1984); Santiago (1992); South, Crowder, and Chavez (2005a, 2005b, 2005c).

10 An exception is Myers and Cranford (1998).

11 To categorize suburbs, the typology draws on their following attributes: tax capacity, population density, poverty rate, age of housing stock (a proxy for age of infrastructure), and population growth. Orfield and his associates grouped these attributes using the K-means clustering procedure in SPSS, which yielded the six distinct classifications. We used this typology by spatially matching tracts to the municipalities used by Orfield. We then coded the tract to be the category of the typology of the municipality within which it was located. In most cases, there was no overlap, but in cases when a tract crossed two municipal types, we assigned it the value for the municipality within which the majority of the tract resided. The purpose of this typology extends beyond demonstrating suburban variety. For the goal of Orfield and his associates is also to show the potential vulnerability of suburbs to the same fiscal problems afflicting the central city. We overlaid Orfield's results on the 2000 tract boundaries, which compose the constant in the Neighborhood Change database (NCDB; Geolytics Inc. 2004). The NCDB fixed the tract boundaries at those of the 2000 census, which allows us to consider changes in the population within a given geography independent of changes in the geography itself. Orfield and his associates developed these categories based on the 2000 census. This paper looks at the growth of these areas since 1970. It is important, therefore, to remember that the descriptions apply to 2000. We cannot be certain that the classification would be appropriate or similar thirty years earlier, although the data, as the following analyses show, suggest consistency.

12 Our concept of buffers was in part informed by Somekawa (1995).

13 In the interests of space, we have kept tables and figures to a minimum in this article. Data available on request.

14 This is calculated among those with recorded professions.

15 As mentioned previously, the individual and the tract data do not result in identical population estimates. The numbers presented in this section are derived from the tract-level Neighborhood Change database (NCDB; Geolytics Inc., 2004). The estimated number of foreign-born for Greater Philadelphia is generally higher when derived from the individual data, resulting in the percentage of total growth attributable to immigration being higher as well. Therefore, the NCDB tract data are likely to be a conservative estimate of the actual percentage of the total growth attributable to the foreign-born. The distribution described by Table 5 includes only the race/immigrant categories described. The population of greater Philadelphia is somewhat more diverse, and increasingly so, and the total population attributable to the foreign-born is based on change in the total population, including groups not included in Table 5.

16 In this analysis, which necessarily uses the classifications in the NCDB, native-born white unfortunately includes Puerto Ricans. In subsequent analyses, using other sources, we will try to examine the Puerto Rican-born population separately.

17 8.34%, 54.14%, and 25.35%, respectively, compared to 121.58% in at-risk developing suburbs, 415.94% in bedroom developing suburbs, and 116.96% in suburban job centers.

18 Authors' analysis; data available on request.

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